Should Regulators' Audits Be Geared to Finding Ponzi Schemes Like that of Madoff?

No, no link. You're probably tired of reading all those Madoff stories already. And the other guys, Nadel, Cosmo, et al.

I believe it is fair to say that the SEC and the states' routine compliance audits focus on routine and rather mundane procedural compliance matters. Do you have the proper files, are they current, do you avoid various specific fiduciary or suitability no-no's? Have you done whatever the last guy to hit the newspapers and embarrass the agency was guilty of doing? I other words, are you honest but guilty of sloppy record-keeping? Are you guilty of whatever the latest hot-button issues are?

I would submit that it would be a good and reasonable goal to get beyond that kind of predictable bureaucratic thinking. A suggested goal, which would require legislation and funding: In the types of investment vehicles where Ponzi-scheme bahavior has occurred, regulate them. Require the types of accounting and other controls under discussion. Third-party, arm's-length portfolio valuation and client reporting. If portfolio holdings are illiquid or unmarketable, require regular, more frequent disclosure, and conservatively value them. If that impacts fees, too bad! Audit them. Regularly. And make those auditors utterly independant of political interference.

Here's an idea the hedge funds will just love! Tax them to pay for the cost of regulating and auditing them to keep them clean.

So, what do you think? Should SEC and other regulatory audits of entities such as hedge funds be designed to do this, to get beyond the usual regulatory issues, to do more, to reasonably minimize the opportunities of men like Madoff and these other bad actors we've been reading about to hurt good people and wonderful charities?

Bloomberg's strangest headline of the day, "It's Time to Meet the Subprime Devil We Don't Know: Caroline Baum"

Is this perhaps a slightly awkward headline? I always figured she was perfectly nice. (Just kidding now.)

Seriously, she has a very substantial point: Is the lack of transparency which goes with certain investments such as some mortgage-backed securities, sufficient to make it very difficult to evaluate the risks present in the financial markets? Sufficient to render problematical proper evaluation of the risk present in heavily-leveraged, quantitatively-driven portfolios of such investments? Evidently.

Sufficient even perhaps to alter the "riskiness", i.e., volatility, of even other asset classes? In the short run, apparently. Did Stephen King ever write anything as scary as that?


Bloomberg.com

Here's What the Accounting Watchdog Keeps Hidden: Jonathan Weil / Bloomberg

Not in the CPA realm, never have been. The conflicts which can come at those doing audits, who after all do wish to keep their clients, can be serious indeed. Many times investors have been stunned at things which come out after a company gets a "clean", unqualified auditor's opinion. Accounting firms have been sued by investors and others, and in well-known instances have been devastated by the outcome. As investors, whether you invest in stocks of single companies or in mutual funds, you need to know that decisions on direct holdings or underlying portfolio holdings are made based on fair presentations of the financial picture.

Hold that thought, and read this:
Bloomberg.com: Opinion

UBS Cited By Massachusetts for 'Dishonest, Unethical' Hedge Fund 'Quid Pro Quos'

This sort of thing smells soooo bad.


Bloomberg.com: Worldwide

WSJ looks at fund-of-funds fees, gets a shock -- well, not exactly

Don't you be the one getting a shock! Funds of funds are mutual funds which create a new product by using other funds in the same family as components. An innocuous example is Fidelity's Four-in-One Index Fund, FFNOX. Others are not innocuous. You pay one expense ratio for the fund of funds. But in some instances you could not easily tell what the underlying funds were charging you. It was deep, deep in the prospectus, in craftily worded statements, perhaps without a total, or it could even be changeable, if the fund of funds could reallocate its holdings among the underlying funds at different times. This is actually one area where the regulators have been working to good effect, as now it will be harder to obfuscate on just what the total expense ratio actually is.

I will suggest the Unknown Advisor's Law of Really Bad Disclosure: It is never an accident or oversight.



Green Thumb - WSJ.com